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the pleading is defective since a cause of action for damages
suffered by the parents because of injury to their minor
child is community property (Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d
622, 630 [248 P.2d 922]) and Buel 's alleged wilful misconduct
is imputable to Esther. (Ibid.) [19] [nsofar as Esther
attempts to state a cause of action against her minor son,
James, the pleading is defective since it faih: to comply with
the requirements of section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure.4
'rhe jn('\gment iR reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5770.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. HENRY THOMAS,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law- Writ of Error Coram Nobis- ProcedureJurisdiction.-Where a judgment of conviction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court on appeal, a subsequent petition for
writ of error coram nobis must be addressed to that court and
not to the superior court. (Pen. Code, § 1265.)
[2) Habeas Corpus-Proceedings After Judgment-Successive Appiications.-A petition for habeas corpus, based on the same
grounds set forth in a previous petition which was denied,
will be denied where there has been no change in the facts
or law substantially affecting the legal rights of petitioner.
[3) Criminal Law-Judgment- Arraignment: Appeal- Harmless
Error-Judgment.-While the requirement that defendant be
asked if he has any reason why judgment should not be pronounced (Pen. Code, §§ 1200, 1201) is substantial and a failure
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 107; Am.Jur., Habeas
Corpus, §§ 164, 165.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1038(4); [2] Habeas
Corpus, § 72; [3] Criminal Law,§§ 1006, 1440; [4] Criminal Law,
§ 1298; [5, 6] Criminal Law, § 212.
"'The parent8 of a legitimate unmarried minor child, acting jointly,
may maintain an action for injury to such child caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another. If either parent shall fail on demand to join
as plaintiff in such action or is dead or cannot be found, then the other
parent m~y maintain such action and the parent, if living, who does not
join as plaintiff must be joined as a defendant •• , , "
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to ask the question is fatal to the judgment if defendant has
been deprivrd of counsel, it is not fatal where defendant is
present and rPpr<'sPnted by counsel, and no pre;jmlice appears.
[4] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Judgment.-In the absence of
any showing to the contrary, where the judgment recites that
defendant was asbed if he had any reason why judgment
should not be pronounced, it must be presumed on appeal that
such recital is correct.
[5] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea.-The proper procedure for
withdrawal of a plea after judgment is a motion to set aside
the judgment and permit a withdrawal of the plea, and
such a motion is in the nature of, and is subject to the rules
governing, an application for a writ of error coram nobis.
[6] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea.-An application for withdrawal of a guilty plea after judgment will be granted only
where there exists some fact that, had it been known to the
court, would have prevented rendition of the judgment, which
fact was not known to defendant at that time, and which,
without fraud, mistake or negligence of defendant, was not
presented to the court.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Siskiyou
County denying a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction.
James lVL Allen, ,Judge. Appeal dismissed.
A. J. Zirpoli for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
CAR'fER, .T.-This is an appeal from an order of the
superior court denying a motion to vacate a judgment of
conviction rendered by that court which imposed the death
penalty for murder of the first degree after a plea of guilty;
the motion in the court below was also for withdrawal of
the plea of guilty, and for a stay of execution. The proceeding .in the court below would thus appear to be an application
for a writ of coram nobis. This court granted a stay of
execution in order that defendant's appeal might be considered. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by this court
on automatic appeal. (People v. Thomas, 37 Cal.2d 74 [230
P.2d 351] .)
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 260.
[6j See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 259.
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In support of his motion defendant presented to the court
below an affidavit in which he stated; (1) rrhat he is in
the custody of the warden of San Quentin Prison under the
judg·ment of conviction; that although the judgment recites
that after a hearing on the degree of the offense the court
asked defendant whether he had any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced and defendant made
no i'eply, that such was not true and lw was not so asked.
(2) That defendant was arraigned on December 4, 1950,
and counsel for him, Brawman, was appointed. At the time
to plead on December 6, after a short appearance in court,
Brawman, the district attorney, and judge retired to the
latter's chambers where the jndge stated that Brawman had
told him defendant was ready to plead guilty but hoped he
might be saved the death penalty and that the district attorney
would not insist on that penalty under those circumstances.
The judge had told Brawman he wanted to think it over and
suggested the instant conference. At the conference the
judge said that he had since gone over the transcript of the
preliminary examination and would not bargain since he
was inclined to impose the death penalty whether thP plea
was guilty or not guilty. Brawman, the district attornPy and
judge then returned to the courtroom and the judge declared
court in session again. Defendant claims that Brawman did
not tell him of the conference and that he had no knowledge
thereof. ( 3) 'fhat the trial was ''fatally infected'' because:
(a) He was denied effective assistance of counsel because
Brawman consulted with him for only a "few minutes" on
the day of arraignment; a ''few minutes'' in the sheriff's
office thereafter and for five minutes after the conference
heretofore mentioned. (b) 'l'here was not a ''competent and
intelligent'' waiver of a jury trial. (c) The court did not
advise him of his rights and the consequences of a plea of
guilty. (d) rrhe plea was not understandingly entered and
the proceedings were too hurried. ( 4) rrhat he told his counsel
that he had a good military record; that he had some whiskey
before the robbery; that there was a scuffle before he shot
and he had not intended to kill Mrs. Aillsworth; that none
of these things were brought out at the hearing on the
degree of the crime and the punishment to be imposed.
Defendant presented points and authorities with his motion.
After considering defendant's affidavits and points and
authorities the motion was denied.
The attorney general has noticed a motion to dismiss the
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appeal or to affirm the court's order of denial on the ground
that the motion was frivolous and only to delay the execution
in that the issues raised on the motion had been adjudicated
adversely to defendant by this court in the original automatic
appeal (People v. Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.2d 74), and in the
denial of two petitions for habeas corpus, as well as by the
United States District Court and Court of Appeals (Thomas
v. Teets, 220 F.2d 232); that since defendant's motion in the
trial court was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
it should have been addressed to this court under section 1265
of the Penal Code. 1
[1] With reference to the last contention that a petition
for a writ of error coram nobis must be made to an appellate
court, although this court has not passed on section 1265,
supra, the District Court of Appeal has held that it is not
a violation of due process nor an encroachment of the jurisdiction of the superior court as stated in our Constitution
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5; People v. Sica, 116 Cal.App.2d 59
[253 P.2d 75]) and that the jurisdiction of the appellate
court is exclusive. (People v. Dunlop, 102 Cal.App.2d 314
[227 P.2d 281]; People v. Schunke, 102 Cal.App.2d 875 [228
P.2d 620] ; People v. Ponce, 103 Cal.App.2d 271 [229 P.2d
77].) The language of section 1265 is clear and defendant
has presented no excuse for not applying to this court for
coram nobis.
With regard to the prior applications for habeas corpus
both in this court and the federal courts mentioned by the
attorney general, it appears that applications for habeas
corpus were made to this court and denied on August 28,
1951, and July 6, 1955. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in each case. The grounds advanced in those
proceedings are the same, with one omission, 2 as in the instant
one. In the federal courts the district court held a hearing
to determine the facts and then denied habeas corpus. That
was affirmed by the court of appeals (Thomas v. Teets, supra,
220 P.2d 232, 234) where the court stated the facts as follows:
1

' ' • • • if a judgment lms been affirmed on appeal no motion shall be
made or proceeding in the nature of a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis shall be brought to procure the vacation of said judgment,
except m thE' court which affirmed the judgment on appeal." (Pen.
Code, § 1265.)
"Heretofore defendant had, in addition, claimed that the sheriff told
him he had better plead guilty because if it got out that he was a
Negro it would be had for him. The facts were determined adversely
to him on that issue in the federal court proceedings, infra.
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" 'It is manifest that his attorney conveyed to petitioner the
substance of the conversations had with the trial judge.' . . .
This of course is the testimony of the lawyer which it is
apparent the trial court believed. This testimony disclosed
that the lawyer fully advised Thomas of the seriousness of
the situation; of the difficulty of decision as to whether to
plead guilty or not guilty, and that Thomas himself made
the decision, against the lawyer's advice, although the lawyer
did not overrule it since Thomas appeared to be a very intelligent person and he felt the decision should be made by
Thomas." It was there concluded that defendant was not
denied the effective assistance of counsel, or deceived by his
counsel, or prevented from having a hearing on the degree
of the crime and the punishment to be imposed.
[2] The denial of habeas corpus by this court and by
analogy the denial of a writ by the federal courts makes
appropriate the application of the rule that: '' 'There is
nothing . . . to exclude this case from application of the
established rule that a petition for habeas corpus based upon
the same grounds set forth in a previous petition which was
denied will be denied where there has been no change in the
facts or law substantially affecting the legal rights of the
petitioner.' (In re Miller (1941), 17 Cal.2d 734, 735 [112
P.2d 10].)" (In re Chessman, 43 Cal.2d 391, 399 [274 P.2d
645], quoting from In re De La Roi, 28 Cal.2d 264, 275 [169
P.2d 363] .) In the automatic appeal this court said: "At
that time, after a brief appearance in court, counsel for
defendant and McCain's counsel, and the district attorney
retired to the judge's chambers where the judge said that
Mr. Brawman had spoken to him in regard to the possibility
of defendant's avoiding the death penalty by making a 'certain' plea. The judge remarked that he had read the transcript of the preliminary hearing and that he was 'inclined'
to give the 'extreme' penalty whether he pleaded guilty or
not guilty. On returning to court, defendant pleaded guilty
and December 11, 1950, was fixed as the time for 'pronouncing
judgment,' later continued to December 14, 1950, when the
court announced it would hear evidence on the degree of the
offense. The district attorney called decedent's husband,
Ainsworth, to the stand and he testified to the facts relating
to the killing. Defendant's counsel was asked by the court
if he wished to cross-examine and declined. The court then
remarked: 'Step down (addressing the witness). I don't
think we will need any further.' The district attorney then
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made the same remark, to which the court replied 'All right.'
Defendant's counsel remained silent. The court then stated
that it was murder of the first degree. Thereafter when asked
by the court whether he had any legal cause to show why
sentence should not be pronounced, defendant stood mute.
'rhe death penalty was imposed.
"There is no question that the evidence is ample to establish murder in the first degree, for it was committed while
attempting to commit robbery. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Defendant's excuse for not offering any evidence on the question
of penalty is that the court's remark heretofore quoted foreclosed such offer. 'l'hat remark may not necessarily be so
construed, and the court, as seen, did not only take the
evidence on the subject consisting of Ainsworth's testimony,
but also the evidence given at the preliminary hearing which
went into the details of the crime from the planning of it
to the flight. Moreover, defendant stood mute when asked
if he had any legal cause to show why sentence should not be
pronounced and it was not until then that the death sentence
was 'pronounced.' " (People v. Thomas, s11pra, 37 Cal.2d 74,
75-76.)
Insofar as the question of the alleged failure of the court
to ask defendant if he had any reason why judgment should
not be pronounced, we stated, as above set'n. on the automatic appeal (People v. Thomas, s11pra. 37 Cal.2d 74, 76)
that when def<"mlant was ashd th<" question he stood mute.
Although it does not appear in the reporter's transcript
whether the question was asked it was recited by the court
in its judgment that it was. [3] In any event, while the requirement (Pen. Code, §§ 1200, 1201) that the question be
asked is substantial and a failure to ask it is fatal to the
judgment if defendant has been deprived of counsel (In re
Levi, 39 Cal.2d 41 [244 P.2d 403]) it is not fatal where
defendant is present and represented by counsel and no
prejudice appears (People v. Henry, 86 Cal.App.2d 785 [195
P.2d 478] ; People v. Hawthorne, 63 Cal.App.2d 262 [146
P.2cl 517]; People v. Swift, 140 Cal.App. 7 [34 P.2d 1041];
People v. Wademan, 38 Cal.App. 116 [175 P. 791] ). [4] In
the absence of any showing to the contrary we must assume
that the r<"cital in the judgment is correct. (People v. W acleman, snpra, 38 Cal.App. 116, 137.) Defendant's counsel was
fully advised of all circumstances bearing upon the d<"gree
of the crinw am1 punishnwnt to be impos<"d and had an opportunity to present them at the hearing. Both defendant and
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his counsel were present when judgment was pronounced
and no objection was made.
[5] With respect to that part of defendant's motion which
asked to withdraw his plea of guilty it has been said: ''The
proper procedure for withdrawal of a plea after judgment
is a motion to set aside the judgment and to permit a withdrawal of the plea. Such a motion is in the nature of. and
is subject to the rules governing, an application for a writ
of coram nobis." (14 Cal.Jur.2d. Criminal Law. § 260.)
[6] And ''An application for withdrawal of a guilty plea
after judgment will be granted, however. only where there
exists some fact that, had it been known to the court. would
have prevented rendition of the judgment. which fact was
not known to defendant at that time, and which. without
fraud, mistake, or negligence of the defendant. was not presented to the court." (14 CaLJur.2d, Criminal I)aw, § 259.)
No such after discovered facts appear here.
In view of the repeated adjudications of the issues raised
by defendant and the making of his application for the
writ of coram nobis to the wrong court in the facE' of section 1265 of the Penal Code, supra, defendant's appeal should
be dismissed. (See People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320 [210
P.2d 13]; People v. Shorts, 32 Cal.2d 502 [197 P.2d 3301;
In re De La Roi, supra, 28 Cal.2d 264.)
The appeal is dismissed, the stay of execution heretofore
granted is terminated, and the trial court is directed to proceed with execution of its sentence in the manner provided
by law.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.

